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Carmen García1 Joan-Ramon Borrell2 Juan Luis Jiménez3 José Manuel Ordóñez-de-Haro4 
 
Abstract 
The literature presents mixed contributions about the economic conditions under which 
cartels form and collapse, and about how stable they are across firm-specific and industry-
wide business cycles. The relationship between cartel life cycles and business cycles has not 
been sufficiently analyzed to date. In this paper, we study in depth whether collusion is 
pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical. We analyze the relationship between cartel 
startups/breakups and economic cycles using a dataset of sanctioned cartels by the 
European Commission that were active between 1997 and 2012, after the leniency program 
had already been introduced. We also double check whether this relationship has changed 
with respect to the pre-leniency period from 1991 to 1996. Our results show that cartels are 
more likely to be formed in upturns, but that cartels tend to breakup also in booms. 
Upturns in economic cycles appear to cause cartel turnovers: existing cartels die while new 
ones are set up. Collusion appears to be pro-cyclical with respect to cartel creation, while it 
seems to be counter-cyclical with regard to cartel demise. 
Keywords: Cartels; Business Cycles; Business Expectations, Antitrust. 
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1. Introduction 
In the last decades, the tools at the disposal of Antitrust Authorities in the fight against 
cartels have improved considerably, being the leniency program the cornerstone of the 
most important instruments. Although some improvements have been made, the fact that 
cartels are illegal makes them highly secretive, which complicates the task of proving their 
existence. Therefore, it would be useful to have some collusive markers or some screening 
instruments to monitor some markets with environments conductive to collusion. 
There are two seminal papers that linked business cycles and cartel stability: Rotemberg 
and Saloner (1986) and Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991). However, the former shows 
that collusion is counter-cyclical while the latter that it is pro-cyclical. All in all, collusion 
may be one or the other depending on the modelling details that prevail on the data. 
Bagwell and Staiger (19997), Fabra (2006), Levenstein and Suslow (2011 & 2016), or 
Antonielli and Mariniello (2014), among others, have also tried to offer insights on this 
question.5 Moreover, there are meta-analyses of case studies of cartel cases formed before 
the 1950's, as it is the case in Levenstein and Suslow (2006); or other papers look at some 
statistics like the percentage of months in the sample in which an economic downturn took 
place and the percentage of cartels formed in that period, as it is the case also in Suslow 
(2005). The question of whether collusion is pro-cyclical or contra-cyclical is however 
unsettled. 
In this paper we focus both on cartel formation and breakups, and how these two events 
relate to firm-specific business cycles, price expectations, and industry-wide cycles. We 
study how both the number of cartels formed or collapsing is determined not only by the 
current firm-specific and industry economic situation, but also by the expectations that 
firms' managers have. 
To address these questions we work with the number of cartels formed and with the 
number of cartels broken due to internal reasons in the European Union every month, 
mostly after the introduction of the leniency program (1997-2012), but also during the pre-
leniency period ranging from 1991 to 1996. By estimating a Poisson regression model, we 
                                                 
5 For a revision of this literature, see Levenstein and Suslow (2014). 
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analyze which is the effect of the sector real production (industry growth or decline), of the 
business evolution perceptions in the last months (firm perceived dynamics) and the 
managers' price expectations on the likelihood of setting-up or breaking-apart of any cartel. 
The contributions of this paper are several. First, we study cartel formation itself, using an 
EU database, which has not been broadly studied from an empirical point of view so far. 
Second, we make use of business surveys to analyze cartel formation and breakups, a link 
that has not been used in the literature for this purpose despite the information it provides 
regarding business managers' point of view. Finally, we do not only analyze the relationship 
between cartels and business cycles, but we do also analyze the effect of price expectations 
on cartel formation and breakup. 
Our results show that cartels are more likely to be formed in upturns, but also that cartels 
tend to breakup also in booms. Cartels are more prone to be created when managers 
consider that their firm production has evolved positively in the last three months (growing 
firms) and when they expect a decrease in prices in the near future (with expected declining 
prices). Cartels are more likely to collapse when firms face upturns in real production at the 
EU level. Upturns in economic cycles appear to cause cartel turnovers: existing cartels die 
while new ones are set up. Collusion appears to be pro-cyclical with respect to cartel 
creation, while it seems to be counter-cyclical with regard to cartel demise. 
This paper is structured as follows. After this brief introduction, the second section 
contains a literature review. The data is described and discussed in section 3. Section 4 
details the empirical strategy, before analyzing the results in section 5. Section 6 offers a 
wide set of robustness checks. Finally, the main conclusions of this work are discussed in 
section 7. 
2. Literature Review 
The literature that relates business cycle and cartels focuses mostly on the stability of 
cartels instead of cartel startups or breakups. It has been studied the effect of business 
cycle on cartel duration and collusive pricing from a theoretical and empirical point of 
view, although conclusions are contradictory. 
The classic cartel dilemma was established by Stigler (1964) and developed by Tirole 
(1988). It analyzes if collusion can be sustained if the expected profit from colluding today 
outweighs the expected profit of defecting from a cooperative agreement (see Levenstein 
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and Suslow, 2016, for further explanation). In this model, the impatience of any firm 
owners, so the firm-specific risk premium, is a cornerstone of the cartel stability. 
From the theoretical point of view, the model proposed by Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) 
is a pioneering work linking business cycles and cartel life cycles. Their model looks at 
collusion and business cycles, defined as a boom or recession of demand, but assumes that 
the level of demand is determined each period from an independent and identically 
distributed process. So, in their setup, booms and busts occur from time to time with some 
known probability, but it cannot be predicted when they finally happen. 
The authors investigate the effect of such business cycles of booms and busts on optimal 
collusive pricing. They conclude that for moderate values of the discount factor (mature 
industries, or at least not too risky industries or activities), collusion is countercyclical: 
cartels are more likely to break up in demand booms as deviation today from collusive 
price is less costly in terms of foregone profits in the future, and also the gain of deviating 
from a collusive agreement is greatest during booms. Additionally, collusive price is 
countercyclical: firms also tend to price competitively in demand downturns. 
By contrast, Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991) present a model that allows for both the 
level of current demand and firms' expectations on future demand to change over time. 
Those authors conclude that while the gain of deviating from a collusive agreement is 
greatest during booms, firms find it even more difficult to collude during recessions, as the 
forgone profits from inducing a price war are relatively low. Therefore, collusion is pro-
cyclical, more difficult in busts, easier in booms. 
These two seminal contributions differ with respect the dynamics of the business cycle, 
obtaining completely contradictory results: when booms and bust come from i.i.d 
processes, collusion is countercyclical; but, when business expansions and downturns have 
some correlation over time, collusion is pro-cyclical. 
Bagwell and Staiger (1997) extend the model of collusive pricing assuming that demand 
movements are stochastic and persistent. A Markov process determines the transition 
between slow-growth and fast-growth states. In this case, they show that collusive prices 
are weakly pro-cyclical when demand growth rates are positively correlated through time. 
 5 
Bagwell and Staiger (1997) note that the empirical evidence is mixed since there is both 
pro-cyclical and countercyclical pricing (see, among others, Bils, 1987a; Domowitz, 
Hubbard and Petersen, 1986a, 1986b, 1987; and Rotemberg and Saloner 1986). 
Extending the Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) model by introducing capacity constraints, 
Fabra (2006) shows that when capacity constraints are sufficiently tight, firms find it more 
difficult to collude during booms, whereas the contrary is true for larger capacity values.  
From an empirical point of view, Hyytinen, Steen and Toivanen (2011) use a hidden 
Markov model, which consists of a hidden process (the industry cartel dynamics in this 
case, since there may be industries never investigated or convicted) and an observation 
process that reveals information on the state of the hidden process for some periods (what 
the researcher knows about the state of the industry in a given period). They find that the 
chance of forming a cartel is around 20%, increases over their sample period and responds 
to positive shocks to GDP being then pro-cyclical. 
Suslow (2005) uses an empirical model to test for the importance of demand uncertainty 
and cartel organizational characteristics in determining cartel duration. She finds out that 
economic uncertainty, measured as the fluctuation of an industrial production index, 
accounts for most of the variance in the duration of the cartel agreements. Also Levenstein 
and Suslow (2011) analyze the impact of cartel organizational features, as well as 
macroeconomic fluctuations and industry structure, on cartel duration. They find that firm-
specific measures of impatience are systematically related to cartel breakup. In a later work 
(Levenstein and Suslow, 2016), these authors found a positive relationship between market 
interest rates and probability of cartel breakup, outcome that they did not find for the 
international cartels analyzed in their previous work. 
Table 1 summarizes the contributions of the literature on the relationship between 
collusion and business cycles. 
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Table 1: Empirical and theoretical literature regarding business cycles and cartel 
formation/breakups 
Year Authors Methodology Database Results 
1986 
Rotemberg and 
Saloner 
Theoretical - 
Collusion is counter-cyclical.  
Collusion is more difficult in 
booms, easier in downturns. 
1991 
Haltiwanger and 
Harrington 
Theoretical - 
Collusion is pro-cyclical. Firms 
find easier to collude during 
booms, more difficult to collude 
during recessions. 
1997 
Bagwell and 
Staiger 
Theoretical - 
Collusion is pro-cyclical, more 
likely in booms, when demand 
growth rates are positively 
correlated through time. 
2005 Suslow 
Proportional 
Hazard Model 
71 international 
manufacturing 
and commodities 
cartels: 1920-
1939 
Collusion is pro-cyclical: 
economic uncertainty, measured 
as the fluctuation of an industrial 
production index, accounts for 
most of the variance in the 
duration of the cartel agreements. 
2006 Fabra Theoretical - 
Collusion is counter-cyclical 
when capacity constraints are 
sufficiently tight, firms find it 
more difficult to collude during 
booms. The contrary is true, 
collusion is pro-cyclical, for 
large capacity values. 
2011 
Hyytinen, Steen 
and Toivanen 
Hidden 
Markov 
Model 
109 legal Finnish 
manufacturing 
cartels: 1951-
1990  
Collusion is pro-cyclical. The 
chance of forming a cartel is 
around 20%, it increases over 
their sample period and responds 
to positive shocks to GDP. 
2011 
Levenstein and 
Suslow 
Proportional 
Hazard Model 
81 international 
cartels (US or 
EC): 1990-2007 
Firm-specific measures of 
impatience (firm risk premiums) 
are systematically related to cartel 
breakup. 
2016 
Levenstein and 
Suslow 
Proportional 
Hazard Model 
247 US non-bid-
rigging cartels: 
1961-2013 
Cartels are more likely to break 
up during periods of high real 
interest rates. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
As we have seen above, theory papers are offering different conclusions with respect to the 
relationship of cartel stability and the business cycle, and also the evidence provided by the 
empirical literature is mixed. There is a gap in the literature to study more in depth to what 
extend and in which circumstances collusion is pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical. Instead of 
relying in country data, we are going use data coming from business surveys regarding firm-
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specific business dynamics and price expectations, and also industry specific production 
dynamics to analyze startups and breakups of cartel discovered and sanctioned by the 
European Commission. 
Therefore, the objective of this paper is to study whether the conditions or the variables 
related to the firm and industry business cycle affect the stability of collusive agreements, 
and to what extend such variables affect the formation and breakup of these illegal 
agreements symmetrically. 
3. Data 
The dataset has been constructed from the European Commission’s decisions in cartel 
cases between 1976 and 2012. The European Commission has sanctioned 121 cartels over 
this period. Most of these cartels were discovered due to investigations initiated by the 
Commission's own initiative or following complaints by third parties (67 cartel cases), and 
the other 54 cartel cases have been detected under the EU Leniency Program since it was 
set up in 1996. 
From the published Commission’s decisions we obtained information regarding the 
formation and breakup date of the cartels. The former corresponds to the first moment for 
which the authority has evidence of a collusive agreement, which usually is a date before 
the starting date of the investigation. The latter is the first moment for which the cartel 
breaks up which could be a date before or after the opening of the investigation 
procedures.6  
In this paper, we are going to analyze the likelihood of two different events across time 
(months): (1) the event of a cartel set up in the manufacturing industry in the EU in any 
month from January 1997 to December 2012 according to the European Commission files 
of sanctioned cartels; (2) the event of a cartel break up in the manufacturing industry in the 
EU in any month from January 1997 to December 2012 according to the European 
Commission files of sanctioned cartels. We also double check whether the introduction of 
the leniency program in 1996 changed the impact of economic cycles on cartel set up and 
                                                 
6 See Connor (2014) for a discussion of the potential difficulties in setting exactly the date of birth 
and death of cartels. 
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breakup using evidence of the previous pre-leniency period from January 1991 to 
December 1996.7 
When studying cartel breakups, we restrict the empirical analysis to the cartels for which 
the breakups are due to cartel internal reasons. We qualify a cartel breakup as one due to 
“internal reasons” whenever the cartel breakup date precedes the date at which the 
investigation started, and also all the cases that start by a leniency application: the cases in 
which the cartel breakup date is in any date before or after the opening of the investigation 
whenever it is triggered after any cartel member applies for the leniency program. 
Recall that cartel investigations may have been launched by four different means: (1) 
Commission own initiative (ex-officio), (2) third party complaint, (3) after a cartel member 
notification during the pre-2004 regime in which agreements among firms had to be 
notified and could be authorized by the Commission (when they were not authorized, a 
cartel investigation could also be launched), (4) after one or more cartel members notified 
their participation in a cartel and applied for a lenient sanctioning treatment under the 
leniency program available since 1996 onwards. 
We do only focus on these cases in which the break-up is due to internal reasons because 
we are interested in analyzing firms’ behavior regarding cartel activities taking into account 
their appraisal about the business cycle: firm perceptions of past business evolution, firm 
selling price expectations, and EU real production cycles. We leave for further investigation 
the question of what are the drivers of cartels breakups when there is an external action 
such as an European Commission investigation triggered by the EC own initiative (with or 
without having denied an agreement authorization), after a third partly complain, or when 
the break up occurs sometime after one of the cartel members apply for the leniency 
program. 
We have also computed the date of the final decision adopted by the European 
Commission to create a variable called sanctioned cartels (the number of sanctioned cartels by 
month), which will control for the potential destabilizing effect of the European 
                                                 
7 The time series of business evolution and price expectations starts in January 1985, while the 
series of production index at European level starts in January 1991. This is the reason why our pre-
leniency sample only goes back only until January 1991. 
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Commission cartel law enforcement on existing cartels, and its deterrent effect on cartels 
that would not have formed yet. 
We restrict the empirical analysis to the manufacturing industry sector (sector C in NACE 
Rev.2 classification) because it is the only sector for which we have information for all the 
independent variables, i.e., business evolution, price expectations and the production index. 
Although we are not able to exploit the fact that more and different industries different 
from manufacturing are cartelized due to the unavailability of data of either the business 
surveys or economic data, we do not consider this to be a major problem for two reasons. 
First, 96 out of the 121 cartel cases sanctioned between 1976 and 2014 by the European 
Commission that we use to construct our dataset belong to the manufacturing sector 
(79%)8. As shown in table 2, 71 out of 98 cartels sanctioned between 1991 and 2012, the 
whole time period pre- and post-leniency program used below in our estimates, belong to 
the manufacturing sector (72%). And also, 67 out of 85 cartels sanctioned in the post-
leniency program period from 1997 to 2012 belong to the manufacturing industry (79%). 
In addition, 48 out of the 96 cartel cases in the manufacturing sector have been discovered 
under the Leniency Program (50%), 9  which means that the firms cooperate with the 
European Commission and therefore, the date of formation reflects on average more 
closely the start of the collusive agreement.10 
On the other hand, if we look at the EU-27's non-financial business economy at the 
NACE section level, the manufacturing sector is summing up a wide variety of activities. 
Additionally, around 10% of all enterprises belong to the manufacturing industry. 
Moreover, within the EU-27's non-financial business economy, in 2012, the manufacturing 
was the second largest in terms of its contribution to employment (22.6%) and the largest 
contributor to value added (26.8%).11 Given the importance of the manufacturing sector in 
                                                 
8 Sorting the sectors by number of cases discovered, the Manufacturing Sector is followed by the 
Transportation and Storage Sector, which has 12 cases. 
9 In 54 out of 121 cartel cases considered (44.63%), the European Commission’s investigation was 
initiated following applications for leniency. 
10 Actually, 15 out of the 19 cases for which we analyze cartel formation and 45 out of the 50 
cartels for which we study the breakup in the period 1997-2012 were discovered under the leniency 
program (78.95% of the formed ones and 90% of the broken ones).  
11 Source: Eurostat 
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the EU, it is relevant to focus in this industry. Moreover, as Levenstein and Suslow (2014) 
state, there are some industries that seem particularly prone to collusion activity. 
Specifically they cited those characterized by high fixed costs as in manufacturing sector. 
Table 2: Summary of cartel cases sanctioned by the European Commission 
(1991-1996 & 1997-2012) (% of cartel cases belonging to the manufacturing sector) 
 
All Sectors Manufacturing Sector 
1991-1996 1997-2012 1991-1996 1997-2012 
Cartel sanctioned 13 85 4 (30.77%) 67 (78.82%) 
Cartel set up  33 29 25 (75.76%) 19 (65.52%) 
Cartel break up 21 80 12 (57.14%) 62 (77.5%) 
Cartel break up (internal reasons): A+B. A+a+b 7 59 5 (71.43%) 50 (84.75%) 
A. Breakup before opening investigation 
(no leniency) 4 8 2 (50%) 5 (83.33%) 
B. Investigation started by leniency program  3 51 3 (100%) 45 (88.24%) 
a. Breakup after leniency 
application 0 19 0 15 (78.95%) 
b. Breakup before leniency 
application  
3 32 
3 (100%) 30 (93.75%) 
Source: Own elaboration 
As table 2 shows, 50 out of 67 cartels of the manufacturing industry sanctioned by the EC 
after 1997 broke up due to internal reasons, not as a result of a targeted investigation 
initiated by the Commission on its own initiative or following a complaint. 45 out of those 
50 were initially investigated using the leniency program, so the leniency application of one 
cartelist enabled the Commission to initiate an investigation: 30 of them broke apart before 
the leniency application, while 15 of them broke apart after the leniency application. The 
other 5 out of 50 broke apart before the Commission started the investigation by its own 
initiative or third party complaint, not using the leniency program. Finally, only 19 
(discovered) cartels were started up after January 1997. Table 2 also shows that most of the 
cartels sanctioned belongs to the manufacturing industry, particularly in the 1997 to 2012 
period.  
The variables we are going to model are denoted as formed cartels and broken cartels. The 
former tells us the number of (discovered) cartels that were formed each month of the 
database in the manufacturing sector. The latter is the number of (discovered) cartels in the 
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manufacturing sector that were broken due to internal reasons each month of the period 
studied.12  
As summarized in Table 3, the variable regarding monthly cartel formation takes value 
from 0 to 3, while the one of monthly cartel breakup takes value from 0 to 4. The variable 
sanctioned cartels13 takes value from 0 to 6, which means that up to 6 cartels were sanctioned 
the same month by the Commission. 
Figure 1 depicts all three variables over time. As we focus in the cartels sanctioned between 
January 1997 and December 2012 that at the same time were formed in that time span, the 
figure shows that cartels sanctioned were mostly set up at the first half of the period under 
study. By contrast, the figure shows that cartels sanctioned break up all along the period 
under study, since many of them were formed before 1997. The cartels sanctioned during 
the period of study refer to cartels born before or after 1997 in any sector, although the 
cartels sanctioned in Figure 1 refer only to the manufacturing sector. 
                                                 
12 As explained before, we include all the cartels that collapsed due to internal causes: they had 
broken up before they were discovered by the Commission or a third party, and also those that 
broke because one of the members applied for leniency. In the latter case, we use the date of the 
application as breakup date if application occurred before the collusive agreement completely 
collapsed as leniency application are noticed and the data shows that it does not take long to 
completely collapse. 
13 This variable includes the cartels sanctioned by the European Commission every month in all 
sectors, since the discovery of a relevant cartel in another sector could increase the deterrent effect 
of the Commission in any unrelated sector. Results are robust to considering only the cartel cases 
sanctioned in the manufacturing sector.   
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Figure 1: Number of monthly formed, sanctioned and broken by internal reasons 
cartels in the manufacturing sector (1997-2012) 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
As noted above, we introduce a novel approach with regard to the related literature by 
taking into account business managers’ expectations. The variables business evolution and price 
expectations were obtained from the Business and Consumer Surveys, which is a harmonized 
survey managed by the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs of the 
European Commission. 14  The data consists of monthly time series according to the 
Classification of economic activities in the European Community (NACE) at the two digits 
level, so it is disaggregated by sector and subsector. 
According to Taylor and McNabb (2007), the business confidence indicator is pro-cyclical 
and it can generally predict movements in GDP over the business cycle and downturns. 
Since the process of forming a cartel takes some time, we are glad to use the survey 
variable on price expectations instead of the current price as the decision of engaging in cartels 
                                                 
14 The Joint Harmonised EU Programme of Business and Consumer Surveys, User Guide, 2007. 
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/surveys/index_en.htm  
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today could be more affected by price expectations in the future than by current price 
levels. 
Both variables are indices, and they correspond respectively to the questions "how has your 
production developed over the past 3 months?" and "how do you expect your selling price to change over the 
next 3 months?" The surveys are conducted at firm level, and then the data is classified and 
aggregated by stratum (i.e., by sector) and countries, using adequate weights. The 
geographical coverage of the surveys includes all Member States as well as the candidate 
countries, although we do only use Member States results. The harmonized surveys are 
carried out at national level by national institutes and offices. The sample size for each 
survey varies across countries according to the heterogeneity of their economies and their 
population size. The sample of the industry survey includes more than 38,000 units that are 
surveyed every month, in the first two-three weeks of each month. The industry survey is 
largely qualitative. 
The survey questions of interest for our study admit three possible responses: increase, 
remain unchanged and decrease. Answers obtained from the surveys are aggregated in the 
form of balances, which are constructed as the difference in the percentage of positive and 
negative answers. The information provided allows the use of a range of variables to 
monitor cyclical dynamics. 
We have used non-seasonally adjusted data for business evolution and price expectations, and 
data adjusted by working days in the case of production EU. The variable production EU has 
been obtained from Eurostat. The time series corresponds to monthly data of the volume 
index of production in industry (manufacturing sector), at European level (EU18) and 
where 2010=100. The variable high production growth takes value 1 if the growth rate of the 
production index is above the average yearly growth rate. The descriptive statistics of these 
variables are shown in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Summary statistics (1997-2012) 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Formed Cartels 192 0.099 0.363 0 3 
Broken Cartels due to Internal Reasons 192 0.260 0.583 0 4 
Business Evolution 192 0.312 12.013 -49 19 
Price Expectations 192 4.562 7.917 -14 23 
Active Cartels 192 16.885 14.745 0 44 
Sanctioned Cartels 192 0.443 0.817 0 6 
High Production Growth 192 0.471 0.500 0 1 
Production EU 192 101.181 10.381 68.1 123.2 
Source: own elaboration 
Finally, we computed the variable active cartels as the stock number of detected and 
sanctioned cartels that were alive in each month given their respective startup and breakup 
date to control for the level of finally discovered and sanctioned colluding activity across 
time. 
4. Empirical strategy 
The purpose of this paper is to study the drivers of cartel formation and breakup. We 
analyze which is the role of managers’ perception about the evolution of their business and 
expectations they have regarding the selling price, and also the effect of the industry 
production on the dependent variables of interest. Our empirical strategy uses Poisson 
model estimations. This type of model is used when the dependent variable is a count 
variable, as it is in our case. It means that the variable to be explained takes on nonnegative 
integer values; so even the value zero has positive probability of occurrence in both cases 
(formed and broken cartels). 
The basic Poisson model assumes that y given x has a Poisson distribution, and the density 
of y given x is completely determined by the conditional mean. That is: 
 
f y x( ) = exp -m x( )éë ùû m x( )éë ùû
y
y! , where 
 
m x( ) º E y x( ) . Given a parametric model 
for the conditional mean and a random sample, the parameters of interest are obtained by 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation. The log-likelihood for observation i is: 
 
ℓ
i
b( ) = yi exp x ib( ) - exp x ib( ). 
Another assumption imposed by Poisson distribution is that the conditional variance is 
equal to the conditional mean. However, since this assumption it not usually satisfied in the 
data, there are alternative characterizations of the model such as the Negative Binomial 
Regression, which is estimated by Maximum Likelihood Estimation. It is used when there 
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is over-dispersion. We have tested whether this is the case in our data, but the test 
concludes that there is no over-dispersion, 15  so we can estimate a Poisson regression. 
Nevertheless, even if it was the case, according to Cameron and Trivedi (2009) the Poisson 
panel estimators rely on weaker distributional assumptions than the negative binomial 
model, so that it would be more robust to use the Poisson panel estimators with cluster-
robust standard errors to resolve the usual over dispersion. 
We should also note that working with information regarding cartels means that we can 
only know characteristics of the uncovered cartels. Therefore, if the variables formed or 
broken cartels take the value of zero it could be because no cartel was formed or broken that 
specific month or because it was formed or broken but it hasn't been discovered. 
Unfortunately, we cannot distinguish between these two types of selection, as it is also the 
case in the Zero Inflated Poisson (ZIP) regression. However, this model tries to capture 
which are the relevant variables that cause the count to be zero. Therefore, we have also 
worked with this alternative model specification, but results are not shown in the paper 
since Voung (1989) test16 of ZIP vs Poisson does not favor the former model. 
Summing up, the equation of the full model estimated in order to estimate the relationship 
between formed cartels and expectations is the following one17: 
log E formed_cartelst x( )( ) = b0 +b1business_evolutiont +b2price_expectationst
+b3sanctioned_cartelst +b4 formed_cartelst-1
+b5high_ production_growtht +b6production_EUt
  
   [1] 
where x denotes the vector of independent variables. We estimate different specifications 
of the model by introducing gradually some variables. We consider the simplest baseline 
estimation.  
Regarding the estimation of the equation to explain why cartels break internally, the 
empirical strategy is the same than in equation [1], but substituting the variable of formed 
                                                 
15 We test 
 
H
0
:a = 0  in 
 
var y x( ) = m x( ) +am x( )
2
. 
16 It tests the null hypothesis that the two models fit the data equally well. 
17 The error term does not appear in equation [1] because the model is expressed in terms of the 
conditional expectation.  
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cartels by broken cartels as dependent variable, and the lag of formed cartels by the lag of 
active cartels as regressor. 
log E broken_cartelst x( )( ) = b0 +b1business_evolutiont +b2price_expectationst
+b3sanctioned_cartelst +b4active_cartelst-1
+b5high_ production_growtht +b6production_EUt
  
   [2] 
As previously mentioned, we will gradually introduce covariates in both estimations in 
order to control for different effects by groups of exogenous variables. Results are included 
in the following section. 
5. Results 
The results of the Poisson regression model for equation [1] are shown in Table 4. As 
stated above, we have considered alternative specifications of the model. The results shown 
in the table are the point estimates of the beta coefficients.18 
Table 4: Poisson estimation results. Formed cartels (1997-2012) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Business Evolution 0.060** 0.053** 0.058** 0.061** 0.067** 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.026) (0.029) (0.030) 
Price Expectations -0.072** -0.064** -0.068** -0.084*** -0.089*** 
 (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.029) (0.028) 
Sanctioned Cartels  -1.064* -1.089* -1.082* -1.110* 
  (0.583) (0.582) (0.592) (0.591) 
Formed Cartels (-1)   -14.486***  -15.514*** 
   (0.421)  (0.461) 
High Production Growth    -0.312 -0.370 
    (0.605) (0.625) 
Production EU -0.017 -0.008 -0.012 0.008 0.004 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.024) (0.025) 
Constant -0.417 -1.132 -0.534 -2.568 -2.062 
 (1.992) (1.978) (1.991) (2.352) (2.436) 
Observations 192 192 192 191 191 
Pseudo-R2 0.038 0.070 0.106 0.079 0.115 
Chi2 11.495 12.701 1261.457 17.360 1350.645 
p-value 0.009 0.013 0.000 0.004 0.000 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 significance test. Robust standard errors within brackets. 
                                                 
18 They tell us that one unit increase in the independent variable will increase the average number of 
the dependent variable by  percent. 
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First of all, we can observe how regardless of the model specification the managers’ 
perceptions of the evolution of the firm’s business in the last 3 months affects positively 
and significantly the number of cartels formed. An increase of the business evolution index in 
one unit will increase the average number of formed cartels by around 5.3-6.7%. This 
suggests that cartel formation is strongly pro-cyclical with respect to firm growth: the 
likelihood of cartel set up is related to firm growth in the near past. 
Secondly, the higher the prices are expected to be at the beginning of the month for the 
next three months, the lower the number of cartels formed that month. The effect of an 
increase of one unit in price expectations is that the formation of cartels is reduced 
between 6.4% and 8.9%. On the other way round, collusion is more likely when firms 
expect a decline in prices in the near future: collusion is more likely with expected declining 
pricing. 
It is also remarkable that the number of total sanctioned cartels (in the manufacturing and 
the other industries) in the same period influences negatively cartels formation. Since the 
decision of the European Commission is public, seeing that more cartels are being 
sanctioned seems to be an effective deterrent because it could increase the perceived 
probability of being caught. 
Moreover, the number of cartels formed in the previous period also affects negatively the 
number of cartels formed. This can be explained by the fact that, if the sector is already 
highly cartelized, there are fewer incentives to collude, since the outsiders can free ride 
from higher selling prices and less competition in the market. An alternative explanation 
could be that firms prefer to join existing cartels rather than forming new ones. 
Finally, we cannot draw any conclusion regarding the effect of the industry real production 
index at the EU level, nor from the dummy variable considering high production growth in 
the sector on cartel setting up. It seems that cartel startup is more related to firms-specific 
perceived business cycles rather than industry-wide real production cycles.  
In our results for the post-leniency period, the business evolution has a positive effect on 
cartel set up. Moreover, if firms' managers expect that prices will increase in the current 
and next two months, then fewer cartels are formed. Therefore, in this baseline model, 
what matters for cartel formation is the perception that businessmen have about the 
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evolution of their own production and the prices at which they expect to be selling their 
products in the market the following months. 
Empirical results regarding cartel set up appear to show that collusion is pro-cyclical, these 
results are robust to the ones obtained in the strand of the theoretical literature started by 
the seminal paper of Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991) who showed that it is easier to 
collude during booms and more difficult to collude during recessions, as also in the paper 
by Bagwell and Staiger (1997), and in the case of non-binding capacity constraints studied 
by Fabra (2006). 
Table 5 presents the results of the estimations of equation [2] concerning the explanatory 
variables of the breakup of cartels. 
Table 5: Poisson estimation results. Internally broken cartels (1997-2012). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Business Evolution 0.019 0.019 -0.015 0.020 -0.017 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.022) (0.014) (0.022) 
Price Expectations -0.013 -0.013 0.030 -0.016 0.028 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.037) (0.029) (0.035) 
Sanctioned Cartels  -0.055 0.003 -0.090 -0.039 
  (0.244) (0.201) (0.247) (0.199) 
Active Cartels (-1)   0.041***  0.046*** 
   (0.015)  (0.015) 
High Production Growth    -0.449 -0.621* 
    (0.325) (0.321) 
Production EU -0.002 -0.001 0.023 0.006 0.035** 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 
Constant -1.081 -1.137 -4.615*** -1.669 -5.686*** 
 (1.550) (1.614) (1.786) (1.640) (1.814) 
Observations 192 192 192 191 191 
Pseudo-R2 0.005 0.006 0.049 0.014 0.067 
Chi2 2.096 2.110 15.814 4.317 22.502 
p-value 0.553 0.715 0.007 0.505 0.001 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 significance test. Robust standard errors within brackets. 
Contrary to equation [1], the Poisson estimations of the relationship between managers’ 
appraisal of past production and selling price expectations and the breakup of cartels by 
internal reasons yield several less conclusive results. The number of cartels broken does not 
appear to be related neither with the business evolution in the last three months, nor with 
the level of prices expected by firms’ managers, nor with the number of sanctioned cartels 
in the same or the previous months. However, we will see later on that we can extract 
some conclusions regarding cartel breakup when we include lags of the independent 
variables in the specification of our model.  
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One of the conclusions that model 5 of Table 5 hints at is that the breakup of the cartel is 
more likely to occur the higher the real production of the industry is, although this effect is 
less severe when the production is growing at a high rate (the impact of EU production 
growth at the mean is equal to 3.54 that results from multiplying the estimated coefficient 
[0.035] times its sample average value [101.18], while at the high production growth 
months, this impact is reduced by the estimated coefficient [-0.621], and therefore, the 
impact of EU production growth is 16% lower at high production growth rate months). 
There is weak evidence in favor of counter-cyclical collusion: collusion is more difficult to 
sustain in demand booms, cartels are more likely to break down when the industry real 
production is high. This is more consistent with the seminal paper by Rotemberg and 
Saloner (1986) of unexpected demand booms breaking collusion, and the case of binding 
capacity constraints studied by Fabra (2006), where also demand booms break collusion. 
Summing up, all these results combined tell us that there are asymmetries in the effect of 
economic cycles on cartel setup and breakup: if the firm is doing well in terms of their own 
production and the managers expect their selling price to decrease in the next periods, then 
firms will get involved in a cartel to get larger profits (pro-cyclical cartel setup). On the 
other hand, if the real industry production is high then it is more likely the collapse of the 
cartel (counter-cyclical cartel breakup). Booms bring about a turnover of new cartels 
forming and old cartels collapsing. 
6. Robustness Checks 
In this section, we carefully deepen the analysis of our time series and check whether our 
results are robust to different model specifications. We follow the procedures explained 
below both for cartel formation and cartel breakup. We will also double check to what 
extend the relationship between economic cycles and collusion has remained stable in the 
post-leniency period (1997-2012) with respect to the pre-leniency period (1991-1996) in the 
EU. 
6.1.  Autocorrelation and Endogeneity 
First of all, we are interested in studying the existence of autocorrelation in the residuals of 
the models presented above. In order to do so, we start by performing the Durbin-Watson 
test in the estimation of the models shown in Table 3 and Table 4 by OLS. The reason why 
we use OLS is because the Durbin-Watson test assumes that the residuals are distributed 
according to a normal distribution in order to compute the critical values. Additionally, we 
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include in our tables of results the Durbin’s alternative19 test for autocorrelation. Even 
though in most of the cases there is no autocorrelation, we show the estimation of our 
model by GLS correcting for autocorrelation, to check that our results are robust and do 
not change. 
Alternatively, we analyze the residuals of the Poisson estimations themselves to double 
check whether the results found are due to the use of OLS or if they are similar in the case 
of Poisson. Therefore, after estimating the model, we predict the residuals and then 
estimate an AR(1) process for the mentioned residuals. We will see that there is no 
problem of first-order autocorrelation neither in the case of cartel formation nor in the 
case of cartel breakup. 
The second step we follow, in order to obtain more robust and reliable results, is to 
consider lagged variables in our specifications. There are two reasons why we proceed this 
way: first, in any market we do only observe quantity and prices in equilibrium, and they 
may depend on previous period’s values; second, the market expansion in the sector may 
be endogenous to cartel existence and price evolution. Moreover, the study of the 
correlograms shows that the series are autocorrelated. Therefore, as robustness check we 
have estimated the models presented in Section 4 and 5 changing the number of lags of the 
covariates. We will see that results hold. It should be pointed out that we have studied the 
existence of autocorrelation in the residuals also in this case, but results are not shown due 
to space limitations since the problem of autocorrelation is not present. 
Finally, we consider another potential problem as robustness check. There are grounds for 
the suspicion that the variable price expectations may present endogeneity problems, since the 
expectations expressed by the firm's manager may reflect the fact that the firm has recently 
decided to join a cartel (decision which may or may not be observed by the econometrician 
later on). Therefore, we instrument price expectations using covariates that could explain these 
expectations but that are exogenous to the cartel formation. 20  By using a model of 
Instrumental Variables, we manage to capture only the exogenous part of this variable, this 
is to say, to capture the underlying variance in price expectations independently from being 
                                                 
19 We show the statistic Chi2 and its p-value. Null hypothesis: no first-order autocorrelation.  
20 This idea has been obtained from Perdiguero (2010), although the procedure is slightly different 
in our case. 
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cartelized or not. As excluded instruments we use one lag of the dependent variable21, the 
evolution of the price index in other sectors (Construction and Electricity, gas, steam and 
air conditioning supply) and time fixed effects. We conclude that results do not change 
when this model is used and according to the test of endogeneity, it is not necessary to 
treat the variable price expectations as endogenous. 
6.1.1.    Cartel Startup 
As explained above, we start by showing the results of the OLS estimation in Table 6. 
Since our dependent variable takes positive integer values from 0 to 3, we are not 
interested in the interpretation of the coefficients. What we are interested in is the sign and 
the significance of the coefficients, which agree with the results shown in Table 4.  Apart 
from obtaining that the Durbin-Watson test is close to 2 in all the specifications, the 
Durbin alternative also tells us that the residuals of the different specification are not first-
order autocorrelated at a significance level of 10%.  
Table 6: OLS estimation results. Formed cartels (1997-2012) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Business Evolution 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.006** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Price Expectations -0.006* -0.006* -0.007** -0.007** -0.008** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Sanctioned Cartels  -0.045** -0.048** -0.045** -0.048** 
  (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) 
Formed Cartels (-1)   -0.107***  -0.102*** 
   (0.036)  (0.036) 
High Production Growth    -0.024 -0.023 
    (0.061) (0.061) 
Production EU -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Constant 0.298 0.254 0.294 0.112 0.153 
 (0.236) (0.233) (0.235) (0.237) (0.238) 
Observations 192 192 192 191 191 
R2 0.018 0.028 0.039 0.030 0.040 
Durbin-Watson 2.151 2.143 1.941 2.165 1.972 
Durbin Alternative Chi2 1.599 1.458 1.379 1.271 0.654 
Durbin Alternative p-value 0.206 0.227 0.240 0.260 0.419 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 significance test. Robust standard errors within brackets. 
Even though there is no problem of existence of autocorrelation in the estimation of the 
OLS model, we estimate the Prais-Winsten and Cochrane-Orcutt regression which 
estimates the parameters in a linear regression model assuming that the errors follow a 
                                                 
21 Results do not change if the lag of the instrumented variable is not used as instrument.  
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first-order autoregressive process in order to obtain more robust results. These results are 
shown in Table 7, and we can see that they are very similar to the ones obtained in the case 
of OLS. 
Table 7: GLS (correcting for autocorrelation) estimation results. Formed cartels (1997-2012) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Business Evolution 0.005** 0.005** 0.006** 0.005** 0.006** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Price Expectations -0.007** -0.006** -0.007** -0.008*** -0.009** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Sanctioned Cartels  -0.042** -0.053*** -0.042** -0.054** 
  (0.017) (0.020) (0.019) (0.021) 
Formed Cartels (-1)   -0.190***  -0.186*** 
   (0.033)  (0.033) 
High Production Growth    -0.013 -0.034 
    (0.060) (0.060) 
Production EU -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant 0.297 0.253 0.322 0.125 0.171 
 (0.230) (0.228) (0.234) (0.234) (0.236) 
Observations 192 192 192 191 191 
R2 0.021 0.030 0.061 0.032 0.063 
Rho -0.092 -0.088 0.091 -0.085 0.095 
Durbin-Watson (transformed) 1.978 1.978 1.960 2.009 1.992 
Durbin-Watson (original) 2.151 2.143 1.941 2.165 1.972 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 significance test. Robust standard errors within brackets. 
Now we check whether the residuals of any specification follow a first-order autoregressive 
process when we work with the Poisson model. We compute the residuals from the models 
estimated in Table 4 and we estimate an AR(1) process for the residuals of each 
specification. Results are summarized in Table 8. We can conclude that the coefficient of 
the first lag is not significantly different from zero in any of the specifications, so we 
should not worry about the existence of first-order autocorrelation.  
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Table 8: OLS (of Poisson's residuals) Estimation Results. Formed cartels (1997-2012). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Residual (-1) -0.088     
 (0.072)     
Residual (-1)  -0.095    
  (0.072)    
Residual (-1)   0.003   
   (0.073)   
Residual (-1)    -0.084  
    (0.073)  
Residual (-1)     0.015 
     (0.073) 
Constant -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Observations 192 192 192 190 190 
R2 0.008 0.009 0.000 0.007 0.000 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 significance test. Robust standard errors within brackets. 
Once we have made sure that the residuals are not autocorrelated, we estimate an 
alternative Poisson model in which we include lagged values of the independent and 
dependent variables. Results are shown in Table 9. First note that the conclusions obtained 
from Table 4 still hold: business evolution affects cartel formation positively and significantly 
and price expectations affect cartel formation negatively and significantly in some 
specifications. However, the effect of price expectations is picked up by the first lag of the 
variable. Also the fifth lag of the variable business evolution and the third lag of the variable 
production EU have a positive and significant effect on the dependent variable. These effects 
could be reflecting the fact that the process of making the decision of forming a cartel 
takes some time and it is related to lags of firm level business evolution and production at 
EU level. 
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Table 9: Poisson estimation results. Formed cartels (1997-2012). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Business Evolution 0.279*** (0.075) 0.261*** (0.088) 0.243*** (0.090) 0.259*** (0.092) 0.231** (0.104) 
Business Evolution (-1) -0.231*** (0.069) -0.183** (0.081) -0.095 (0.099) -0.179** (0.087) -0.077 (0.113) 
Business Evolution (-2) -0.009 (0.125) 0.039 (0.130) 0.051 (0.117) 0.046 (0.141) 0.067 (0.138) 
Business Evolution (-3) 0.066 (0.158) 0.009 (0.140) -0.056 (0.147) 0.008 (0.142) -0.061 (0.148) 
Business Evolution (-4) -0.111 (0.097) -0.120 (0.123) -0.103 (0.166) -0.126 (0.119) -0.119 (0.165) 
Business Evolution (-5) 0.221*** (0.070) 0.309*** (0.104) 0.320** (0.131) 0.311*** (0.106) 0.328** (0.148) 
Business Evolution (-6) -0.009 (0.063) -0.111 (0.125) -0.113 (0.156) -0.108 (0.124) -0.111 (0.162) 
Price Expectations 0.227* (0.133) 0.149 (0.138) 0.018 (0.195) 0.156 (0.132) 0.025 (0.187) 
Price Expectations (-1) -0.389* (0.215) -0.315** (0.138) -0.210 (0.205) -0.324** (0.135) -0.221 (0.199) 
Price Expectations (-2) -0.165 (0.222) -0.096 (0.170) -0.097 (0.211) -0.086 (0.180) -0.081 (0.229) 
Price Expectations (-3) 0.169 (0.203) 0.091 (0.185) 0.033 (0.191) 0.070 (0.180) -0.009 (0.187) 
Price Expectations (-4) 0.350* (0.180) 0.235 (0.209) 0.196 (0.278) 0.247 (0.199) 0.221 (0.264) 
Price Expectations (-5) -0.313 (0.243) -0.253 (0.248) -0.214 (0.272) -0.253 (0.246) -0.215 (0.266) 
Price Expectations (-6) -0.185 (0.170) -0.151 (0.217) -0.182 (0.202) -0.161 (0.214) -0.200 (0.188) 
Sanctioned Cartels  -2.580*** (0.968) -2.951** (1.321) -2.650*** (1.004) -3.129* (1.640) 
Sanctioned Cartels (-1)  0.578** (0.253) 0.490* (0.297) 0.587** (0.248) 0.505* (0.292) 
Sanctioned Cartels (-2)  -0.109 (0.507) 0.182 (0.908) -0.094 (0.507) 0.248 (0.942) 
Sanctioned Cartels (-3)  -0.129 (0.691) -0.078 (0.783) -0.172 (0.671) -0.217 (0.889) 
Sanctioned Cartels (-4)  -0.017 (0.385) -0.126 (0.411) -0.032 (0.385) -0.154 (0.410) 
Sanctioned Cartels (-5)  -2.094* (1.191) -2.301 (1.679) -2.094* (1.205) -2.301 (1.773) 
Sanctioned Cartels (-6)  0.096 (0.473) 0.108 (0.636) 0.108 (0.475) 0.161 (0.636) 
Formed Cartels (-1)   -14.505*** (1.755)  -14.877*** (2.011) 
Formed Cartels (-2)   -0.707 (0.725)  -0.857 (0.851) 
Formed Cartels (-3)   0.538 (0.401)  0.490 (0.390) 
High Production Growth    -0.330 (1.053) -0.628 (1.238) 
Production EU -0.037 (0.056) -0.002 (0.043) -0.006 (0.042) 0.009 (0.049) 0.015 (0.059) 
Production EU (-1) 0.064* (0.038) 0.094 (0.078) 0.112 (0.127) 0.083 (0.072) 0.091 (0.110) 
Production EU (-2) -0.057* (0.031) -0.111*** (0.036) -0.117*** (0.041) -0.119*** (0.044) -0.134** (0.056) 
Production EU (-3) 0.032 (0.046) 0.068* (0.039) 0.095** (0.040) 0.076 (0.050) 0.111* (0.066) 
Production EU (-4) 0.130** (0.063) 0.088 (0.078) 0.083 (0.076) 0.088 (0.079) 0.079 (0.079) 
Production EU (-5) -0.054 (0.034) -0.013 (0.078) -0.005 (0.112) -0.004 (0.072) 0.012 (0.098) 
Production EU (-6) -0.026 (0.045) -0.005 (0.029) 0.014 (0.036) -0.008 (0.031) 0.011 (0.036) 
Constant -8.186 (5.995) -14.477*** (5.443) -19.555*** (6.624) -14.725*** (5.494) -20.090*** (6.865) 
Observations 186 186 186 186 186 
Pseudo- R2 0.362 0.463 0.484 0.464 0.485 
Chi2 172.706 145.043 1614.493 150.621 1584.195 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 significance test. Robust standard errors within brackets. 
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Finally, we analyze the results obtained from the IV estimation, which are summarized in 
Table 10. Note that the estimated coefficients are very close to the ones obtained when we 
estimated our model by OLS. The partial R2 is high, which tells us that the additional 
instruments are highly correlated with the potentially endogenous variable after partialling 
out the effect of the other independent variables. Also the Shea’s adjusted partial R2 is high, 
which shows that the component of price expectations that is orthogonal to the other 
regressors can be explained by the component of the predicted value of price expectations that 
is orthogonal to the predicted values of the other regressors in the model.  As hinted 
above, we are interested in analyzing whether the variable price expectations can be treated as 
exogenous, in which case the OLS estimation would be more efficient than the IV 
estimation. We test the null hypothesis, that the variable can be treated as exogenous, with 
Wooldridge’s score test (Robust Score) and the regression-based test (Robust Regression). 
The difference between these tests is that the former assumes that the variables being 
tested are exogenous when estimating the error term’s variance, while the latter assumes 
that the variables being tested are endogenous. According to the results of Table 10, the 
null hypothesis cannot be rejected.  
Table 10: IV estimation results. Formed cartels (1997-2012) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Business Evolution 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Price Expectations -0.007** -0.007** -0.007** -0.008** -0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Sanctioned Cartels  -0.045** -0.048*** -0.045** -0.048** 
  (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) 
Formed Cartels (-1)   -0.107***  -0.102*** 
   (0.035)  (0.035) 
High Production Growth    -0.025 -0.023 
    (0.059) (0.059) 
Production EU -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant 0.289 0.246 0.290 0.102 0.148 
 (0.234) (0.230) (0.232) (0.231) (0.233) 
Observations 192 192 192 191 191 
R2 0.018 0.028 0.039 0.030 0.040 
Robust Score Chi2 0.654 0.568 0.189 0.543 0.160 
Robust Score p-value 0.419 0.451 0.664 0.461 0.689 
Robust Regression F 0.646 0.555 0.183 0.528 0.154 
Robust Regression p-value 0.423 0.457 0.670 0.468 0.696 
Overident. Score Chi2 19.509 19.876 20.410 18.744 19.269 
Overident. Score p-value 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Partial R2 0.940 0.941 0.940 0.941 0.941 
Shea’s Adjusted Partial R2 0.916 0.915 0.915 0.915 0.914 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 significance test. Robust standard errors within brackets. 
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6.1.2.   Cartel Breakup 
We follow the same procedure used for the robustness check of cartel formation for the 
case of cartel breakup. In Table 11 we can see the results of the OLS estimation. As in the 
case of cartel formation, the conclusions obtained from the Poisson model of cartel 
breakup summarized in Table 5 still hold. Also in this case, the Durbin alternative test of 
first-order autocorrelation of the residuals is not significant. When we estimate the model 
correcting for autocorrelation (Table 12) we obtain the same results.  
Table 11: OLS estimation results. Internally broken cartels (1997-2012). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Business Evolution 0.005 0.004 -0.003 0.005 -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) 
Price Expectations -0.003 -0.003 0.007 -0.004 0.007 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) 
Sanctioned Cartels  -0.013 -0.005 -0.024 -0.018 
  (0.055) (0.050) (0.054) (0.048) 
Active Cartels (-1)   0.010**  0.011*** 
   (0.004)  (0.004) 
High Production Growth    -0.116 -0.163* 
    (0.085) (0.088) 
Production EU -0.001 -0.000 0.004 0.002 0.008** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Constant 0.329 0.316 -0.377 0.171 -0.658* 
 (0.418) (0.432) (0.348) (0.447) (0.366) 
Observations 192 192 192 191 191 
R2 0.005 0.005 0.049 0.014 0.067 
Durbin-Watson 1.975 1.973 2.060 1.992 2.103 
Durbin Alternative Chi2 0.027 0.030 0.191 0.002 0.523 
Durbin Alternative p-value 0.870 0.862 0.662 0.963 0.469 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 significance test. Robust standard errors within brackets. 
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Table 12: GLS (correcting for autocorrelation) estimation results. Internally broken cartels 
(1997-2012) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Business Evolution 0.005 0.005 -0.003 0.005 -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) 
Price Expectations -0.003 -0.003 0.007 -0.004 0.007 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) 
Sanctioned Cartels  -0.014 -0.004 -0.024 -0.019 
  (0.054) (0.050) (0.054) (0.049) 
Active Cartels (-1)   0.010**  0.012*** 
   (0.004)  (0.004) 
High Production Growth    -0.116 -0.172* 
    (0.085) (0.089) 
Production EU -0.000 -0.000 0.004 0.002 0.008** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) 
Constant 0.322 0.308 -0.378 0.169 -0.663* 
 (0.419) (0.433) (0.343) (0.448) (0.360) 
Observations 192 192 192 191 191 
R2 0.005 0.005 0.052 0.014 0.074 
Rho 0.012 0.013 -0.032 0.003 -0.054 
Durbin-Watson (transformed) 2.000 2.000 1.995 1.999 1.995 
Durbin-Watson (original) 1.975 1.973 2.060 1.992 2.103 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 significance test. Robust standard errors within brackets. 
After having checked the residuals obtained from the OLS estimation, we are interested in 
studying the potential existence of autocorrelation in the residuals obtained from the 
Poisson estimation too. The results of the AR(1) process estimation from the Poisson 
residuals of the model shown in Table 5, are summarized in Table 13. The coefficient of 
the first lag is not significant, and therefore, we should not worry about the existence of 
first-order autocorrelation.  
Table 13: OLS (of Poisson's residuals) estimation results. Internally broken cartels (1997-
2012). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Residual (-1) 0.015     
 (0.073)     
Residual (-1)  0.015    
  (0.073)    
Residual (-1)   -0.019   
   (0.072)   
Residual (-1)    0.006  
    (0.073)  
Residual (-1)     -0.057 
     (0.073) 
Constant 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.002 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.041) 
Observations 192 192 192 190 190 
R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 significance test. Robust standard errors within brackets. 
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As explained above, we estimate the Poisson model including more lags of the independent 
variables to check the robustness of the results obtained in the baseline model. The model 
presented in Table 14 is slightly more informative than the baseline case considered in 
Table 5. The first lag of business evolution is negative and significant. This means that the 
evolution of the business in the previous 3 months affects negatively and significantly the 
number of cartels broken in a given month. In fact, broken cartels increase by around 14.9-
23.1% if the business evolution index decreases by one unit. This is some weak evidence of 
pro-cyclical collusion with respect to cartel breakups when economic cycles are measured 
using firm-specific business evolution. 
This result is in line with the one obtained in the case of cartel formation: when the 
production faced by an individual firm has evolved positively in the last months it is more 
likely to form a cartel, and if the firms are already in a cartel, then it is easier to sustain 
collusion since it is less likely that a cartel breaks up. The number of cartels broken does 
not appear to be related nor with level of prices expected by firms’ managers nor with the 
number of sanctioned cartels in the same or the previous months. 
Moreover, as shown before, the breakup of the cartel is more likely to occur the higher the 
production of the sector is, although this effect is reduced when the production is growing 
at a very high rate and also when we introduce the fourth and the sixth lags. This is like 
what was found previously, collusion seems to be counter-cyclical with respect to cartel 
breakups when economic cycles are measured using industry wide real EU production. 
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Table 14: Poisson estimation results. Internally broken cartels (1997-2012).  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Business Evolution 0.023 (0.044) 0.005 (0.044) 0.041 (0.053) 0.008 (0.038) 0.055 (0.052) 
Business Evolution (-1) -0.151*** (0.058) -0.159*** (0.061) -0.225*** (0.068) -0.149** (0.060) -0.231*** (0.073) 
Business Evolution (-2) 0.021 (0.044) 0.056 (0.050) 0.036 (0.051) 0.066 (0.055) 0.044 (0.054) 
Business Evolution (-3) 0.100* (0.051) 0.095* (0.051) 0.104** (0.049) 0.065 (0.052) 0.089* (0.049) 
Business Evolution (-4) 0.055 (0.056) 0.076 (0.056) 0.121** (0.060) 0.066 (0.056) 0.113* (0.058) 
Business Evolution (-5) -0.008 (0.049) 0.003 (0.049) -0.001 (0.051) 0.008 (0.051) 0.002 (0.052) 
Business Evolution (-6) -0.018 (0.035) -0.039 (0.036) -0.110** (0.048) -0.021 (0.036) -0.094* (0.049) 
Price Expectations -0.080 (0.070) -0.100 (0.075) -0.021 (0.086) -0.119 (0.073) -0.058 (0.084) 
Price Expectations (-1) 0.054 (0.087) 0.068 (0.099) -0.009 (0.105) 0.077 (0.098) 0.015 (0.100) 
Price Expectations (-2) -0.047 (0.093) -0.027 (0.099) -0.055 (0.097) -0.003 (0.108) -0.024 (0.108) 
Price Expectations (-3) 0.242** (0.102) 0.210** (0.101) 0.282** (0.122) 0.185* (0.107) 0.239* (0.129) 
Price Expectations (-4) -0.085 (0.112) -0.081 (0.109) -0.121 (0.118) -0.090 (0.114) -0.133 (0.123) 
Price Expectations (-5) -0.193* (0.113) -0.232** (0.111) -0.196* (0.104) -0.188 (0.116) -0.138 (0.114) 
Price Expectations (-6) 0.032 (0.076) 0.042 (0.068) 0.050 (0.071) 0.004 (0.067) 0.006 (0.074) 
Sanctioned Cartels  -0.342 (0.356) -0.395 (0.301) -0.351 (0.346) -0.403 (0.291) 
Sanctioned Cartels (-1)  -0.502* (0.270) -0.321 (0.228) -0.556* (0.296) -0.341 (0.239) 
Sanctioned Cartels (-2)  -0.057 (0.184) 0.031 (0.171) -0.079 (0.181) -0.001 (0.170) 
Sanctioned Cartels (-3)  0.028 (0.230) 0.119 (0.204) 0.112 (0.233) 0.199 (0.216) 
Sanctioned Cartels (-4)  0.171 (0.152) 0.140 (0.135) 0.165 (0.156) 0.148 (0.147) 
Sanctioned Cartels (-5)  0.104 (0.140) 0.224* (0.131) 0.185 (0.147) 0.321** (0.138) 
Sanctioned Cartels (-6)  0.117 (0.141) 0.135 (0.142) 0.143 (0.138) 0.180 (0.143) 
Active Cartels (-1)   -0.027 (0.211)  -0.026 (0.202) 
Active Cartels (-2)   -0.047 (0.264)  -0.021 (0.265) 
Active Cartels (-3)   0.159 (0.164)  0.134 (0.182) 
High Production Growth    -1.184** (0.520) -1.206** (0.557) 
Production EU 0.063* (0.036) 0.061* (0.035) 0.074** (0.034) 0.094** (0.047) 0.104** (0.043) 
Production EU (-1) 0.017 (0.022) 0.035 (0.026) 0.053** (0.025) -0.001 (0.032) 0.021 (0.033) 
Production EU (-2) 0.071*** (0.022) 0.097*** (0.031) 0.120*** (0.042) 0.090*** (0.032) 0.115*** (0.043) 
Production EU (-3) 0.018 (0.017) 0.026 (0.019) 0.049** (0.025) 0.040** (0.019) 0.065*** (0.024) 
Production EU (-4) -0.071*** (0.026) -0.071*** (0.024) -0.068*** (0.022) -0.070*** (0.026) -0.066*** (0.024) 
Production EU (-5) -0.020 (0.026) -0.028 (0.027) 0.005 (0.025) -0.020 (0.026) 0.017 (0.024) 
Production EU (-6) -0.060*** (0.022) -0.061*** (0.023) -0.044* (0.026) -0.079*** (0.028) -0.062** (0.031) 
Constant -3.256 (3.944) -7.146* (4.211) -22.539*** (6.229) -6.276 (4.383) -22.574*** (6.516) 
Observations 186 186 186 186 186 
Pseudo-R2 0.153 0.187 0.267 0.201 0.279 
Chi2 43.799 58.844 81.524 62.375 77.379 
p-value 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 significance test. Robust standard errors within brackets. 
Finally, we look at the results of the IV estimation. Also in this case both the partial R2 and 
the Shea’s adjusted partial R2 are high. Still, our test of interest is the potential endogeneity 
of the variable price expectations. At the 10% level of significance we cannot reject the null 
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hypothesis of the variable being exogenous according to both the statistic of the Robust 
Score and the statistic of the Robust Regression. 
Table 15: IV estimation results. Internally broken cartels (1997-2012). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Business Evolution 0.004 0.004 -0.005 0.004 -0.006 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) 
Price Expectations -0.001 -0.001 0.010 -0.002 0.010 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) 
Sanctioned Cartels  -0.014 -0.005 -0.024 -0.018 
  (0.054) (0.049) (0.054) (0.047) 
Active Cartels (-1)   0.011**  0.012*** 
   (0.004)  (0.004) 
High Production Growth    -0.114 -0.162* 
    (0.084) (0.086) 
Production EU -0.001 -0.001 0.004 0.001 0.008** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Constant 0.349 0.337 -0.395 0.193 -0.668* 
 (0.417) (0.430) (0.345) (0.444) (0.361) 
Observations 192 192 192 191 191 
R2 0.005 0.005 0.048 0.013 0.067 
Robust Score Chi2 1.195 1.374 2.561 0.815 1.942 
Robust Score p-value 0.274 0.241 0.110 0.367 0.163 
Robust Regression F 1.158 1.329 2.506 0.776 1.860 
Robust Regression p-value 0.283 0.250 0.115 0.380 0.174 
Overident. Score Chi2 41.180 42.182 40.999 43.717 44.838 
Overident. Score p-value 0.860 0.833 0.864 0.786 0.749 
Partial R2 0.940 0.941 0.929 0.941 0.930 
Shea’s Adjusted Partial R2 0.916 0.915 0.898 0.915 0.898 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 significance test. Robust standard errors within brackets. 
6.2.  Pre-leniency program period 
So far, we have only analyzed the cartel cases formed or broken in the manufacturing 
sector during the period January 1997 to December 2012. However, both the formation 
and breakup of these cartels have been affected by the existence of the leniency program, 
which was introduced in July 1996 in the European Union. This program could produce 
two opposite effects in the dynamics of cartels birth and death. On the one hand, the 
members of a discovered cartel case could benefit from a fine reduction under certain 
circumstances. Therefore, the ex-ante profits from collusion are higher than in the case in 
which the sanctioned firm has to pay the full fine, for a given probability of detection, 
which means that the likelihood of cartel formation increases. On the other hand, the 
incentives to deviate and break up the cartel are higher under the leniency program, since 
the first member revealing the existence of the illegal collusive agreement could get a 
higher or even a full fine reduction. Thus, we should see that the probability of breakup is 
higher.  
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Summing up, the introduction of the leniency program may have affected the way in which 
the independent variables affect our dependent variables of interest. For this reason, we 
focus in this section in the period from January 1991 to December 1996. Following the 
methodology explained in Section 4, we will study how do the business evolution, the price 
expectations, the sanctioned cartels and the production at the European level affect the 
formation and breakup of cartels during this period.  
At Table 2, we can also see how the number of cartels formed in the period 1991-1996 (33 
cartels) is higher than the number of cartels formed after 1997 (29 cartels), while the 
number of broken and internally broken cartels is significantly lower in the period 1991-
1996 (21 and 7 respectively) than in the period 1997-2012 (80 and 59 respectively). 
In Figure 2 we can observe the formation, breakup and sanction distribution of the 
discovered cartels over time the whole time period 1976 to 2012. The number of internally 
broken cartels explodes since 1997, and the number of sanctioned cartels clearly increases 
since 1997 onwards. 
Figure 2: Number of monthly formed, broken, sanctioned and broken by internal 
reasons cartels in the manufacturing sector (1976-2012) 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
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We estimate the same equations than before, now for the cartels startups and breakups 
between 1991 and 1996, in the pre-leniency period using the monthly data described in 
table 16. 
Table 16: Summary statistics (1991-1996) 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Formed Cartels 72 0.347 0.585 0 2 
Broken Cartels due to Internal Reasons 72 0.069 0.306 0 2 
Business Evolution 72 -4.194 10.954 -26 19 
Price Expectations 72 8.389 8.187 -3 32 
Active Cartels 72 37.681 4.776 29 43 
Sanctioned Cartels 72 0.181 0.422 0 2 
High Production Growth 71 0.465 0.502 0 1 
Production EU 72 85.278 8.611 57.1 94.46 
Source: own elaboration 
In Table 17 and 18 we can see the results of the Poisson model estimation of cartel 
formation and breakup, respectively. Analogously, the OLS estimation results of our 
dependent variables of interest are presented in Table 19 and 20. 
Again, for the period before the leniency program (1991-1996), we find that collusion 
seems to be pro-cyclical when looking at cartel setup, while collusion appears to be 
counter-cyclical when looking at cartel breakup. This is similar to the results obtained for 
the post-leniency program period 1997 to 2012. 
However, in the pre-leniency period, the drivers of cartel setup and break up are different 
with respect to the post-leniency period. The driver of cartel setup in the pre-leniency 
period is the industry-wide production growth at the EU level (Table 17), while the drivers 
of cartel setup in the post-leniency period are the firm-level business evolution and price 
expectations (Table 4). 
Table 17: Poisson estimation results. Formed cartels (1991-1996). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Business Evolution -0.016 -0.017 -0.018 -0.015 -0.015 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.020) (0.020) 
Price Expectations -0.019 -0.016 -0.016 -0.006 -0.008 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023) 
Sanctioned Cartels  -0.837 -0.827 -0.551 -0.496 
  (0.639) (0.652) (0.679) (0.712) 
Formed Cartels (-1)   -0.045  -0.148 
   (0.328)  (0.347) 
High Production Growth    1.094** 1.127*** 
    (0.429) (0.427) 
Production EU 0.020 0.023 0.023 -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) 
Constant -2.677 -2.866 -2.899 -0.939 -0.975 
 (2.404) (2.320) (2.363) (2.257) (2.269) 
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Observations 72 72 72 71 71 
Pseudo-R2 0.018 0.034 0.034 0.081 0.082 
Chi2 2.163 4.835 5.522 9.442 11.195 
p-value 0.539 0.305 0.356 0.093 0.083 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 significance test. Robust standard errors within brackets. 
The drivers of cartel breakup in the pre-leniency period seem to be mostly the business 
evolution and price expectations at the firm level (Table 18) and also somehow the EU 
industry real production growth, while in the post-leniency period it appears to be 
exclusively EU industry real production growth (Table 5). Note that this last statement 
should be considered carefully, given that the number of cartels broken due to internal 
reasons is very low during the period January 1991-December 1996. 
Table 18: Poisson estimation results. Internally broken cartels (1991-1996). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Business Evolution 0.425*** 0.445*** 0.580*** 0.407*** 0.557*** 
 (0.142) (0.164) (0.207) (0.152) (0.169) 
Price Expectations -0.262** -0.270** -0.349** -0.253** -0.345*** 
 (0.102) (0.108) (0.138) (0.103) (0.116) 
Sanctioned Cartels  0.389 0.989 1.215* 2.081** 
  (0.649) (0.817) (0.624) (0.934) 
Active Cartels (-1)   -0.328  -0.370* 
   (0.220)  (0.191) 
High Production Growth    1.208 1.532* 
    (0.736) (0.845) 
Production EU 0.397** 0.391*** 0.417*** 0.411** 0.470** 
 (0.159) (0.152) (0.148) (0.173) (0.189) 
Constant -38.772*** -38.413*** -27.639* -41.156** -32.049* 
 (14.734) (14.018) (15.498) (16.240) (18.316) 
Observations 72 72 72 71 71 
Pseudo-R2 0.454 0.457 0.472 0.466 0.486 
Chi2 16.812 17.456 24.946 18.554 40.519 
p-value 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 significance test. Robust standard errors within brackets. 
We double-checked as previously whether these results for the pre-leniency period were 
robust to the presence of auto-correlation or endogeneity of price expectations, and we 
found that they indeed are robust. Results from these robustness checks are available upon 
request from the authors. 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper we shed some light about the impact of economic cycles on cartel formation 
and cartel breaks up. Our results show that the average number of cartels formed increases 
when the firm-level perceived business has evolved positively in the last three months and 
managers expected in the previous period that their selling price would decrease in the next 
three months. Regarding the underlying reasons for cartels break up, the number of 
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ruptures increases when there is real industry production growth at the EU level. We also 
find some weak evidence that cartel breakups are also driven by past positive perceptions 
of firm-specific business evolution. 
In conclusion, our results show that cartels are more likely to be formed in upturns, but 
also that cartels tend to breakup also in booms. Cartels are more prone to be created when 
managers consider that their firm production has evolved positively in the last three 
months (growing firms) and when they expect a decrease in prices in the near future (with 
expected declining prices). Cartels are more likely to collapse when firms face upturns in 
real demand at the EU level. Upturns in economic cycles appear to cause cartel turnovers: 
existing cartels collapse while new ones are set up. 
Collusion appears to be pro-cyclical with respect to cartel creation when cycles are 
measured using firm-specific perceived business evolution (and also somehow with respect 
to cartel breakup when cycles are measured by such firm-specific booms), while collusion 
seems to be counter-cyclical with regard to cartel demise when cycles are measured by 
industry-wide EU production. 
These results should be considered as a first approach to answer the question of interest as 
there is some scarcity of data and we are just relying on the time series of cartel startups, 
cartel breakups, cartels sanctioned and a set of business cycle variables. Ideally, the missing 
data problem should be overcome working with a panel data including more industries and 
territorial units. 
New theoretical analysis should also be developed in line with the ones of Fabra (2006) as 
the results we have obtained are consistent with the result that collusion might be pro-
cyclical when there is not capacity constraints, firms find it easier to collude during booms, 
while collusion is counter-cyclical when capacity constraints are sufficiently tight, firms find 
it more difficult to collude during booms. It might be the case that capacity constraints are 
on average not binding in industries still not colluding (before collusion), so demand 
booms are driving the startup of cartels. After having the cartels functioning, collusion 
might be the driver not only of price hikes but also of coordinated reductions in the 
colluding industries capacities. As capacity constraints get tight, collusion might become 
counter-cyclical, and cartels might finally breakup also during booms. 
 35 
In addition, important further research would be the study, from a theoretical and 
empirical point of view, of the determinants and characteristics that make some cartels 
reach the screen of the Antitrust Authority while other don’t. Finally, the impact of 
successive reforms of the Community leniency program in the dynamics merits some 
further research. 
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